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Abstract: The work of French philosopher Alain Badiou has been described as the most 
powerful alternative yet conceived in France to the various forms of postmodernism that arose 
after the collapse of the Marxist project. Art interests Badiou in its own right but also as both 
that which, in the twentieth century, eclipsed philosophy and as that which today philosophy, 
increasingly de-sutured from art, must imitate in order to make clear that there are truths after all. 
Badiou conceives of law, on the other hand, as part and parcel of a specific political machine 
that must continuously perform certain problematic exclusions if it is to keep the fiction of 
parliamentary democracy together. So how is the relationship between art and law, between the 
poet and the city, in Badiou’s oeuvre? 
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Woher, in aller Welt, bei dieser Constellation  
der Trieb zur Wahrheit! 
[F. Nietzsche]1 
 
 
Quel sera le destin de la pensée, 
Dont on sait bien qu’elle est invention affirmative, 
Ou qu’elle n’est pas ? 
[A. Badiou]2 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The invitation to consider the relationship between art and law is, after all, a 
philosophical invitation, a question for thought. Or is it? The scene, as we know, 
was set long ago, when in Plato’s Republic Socrates first issues Homer, the great 
poet of antiquity, with the rather biting indictment of having been neither a 
Lycurgus nor a Solon, and then proceeds to banish poetry from the city except 
when it comes to ‘hymns to the gods and eulogies to good people’ or else, when it 
is readmitted because ‘it has successfully defended itself, whether in lyric or any 
other meter’.3 It is thus commencing with Plato that good government comes to 
be seen as fundamentally separate from and better a world than that of art so that 
‘law’, too, comes to be understood as ‘not poetry’. We are still, here, in the 
business of naming, and it will take Aristotle to turn naming into categories and 
then the praetor’s edictum to turn categories into personae, res, and actiones – as 
Cicero, for one, was quick to appreciate. And yet, for a long time, recourse to 
poets and to poetry and to their auctoritas or knowledge will be treated with 
suspicion by philosophy, politics, and law, for even Virgil, it came to be feared, 
may prove a misleading witness (falsus testis) or else because, rather more 
annoyingly, thus do many who know nothing yet manage to earn twice as much 
money as those who have the correct knowledge (sic faciunt multi qui nihil sciunt, sed 
lucrantur bis tamen quam illi qui bene sciunt). For a long time, then, the city and its laws 
will evoke poets and poetry so that they could banish them thus affirming or 
reaffirming their own command or their own legitimacy, if not always their own 
prestige. 
                                                     
1 ‘From whence, in the Universe, does the impulse for truth come to this Constellation?’ [Translations in 
this essay are mine, unless otherwise noted]. 
2 ‘What will the destiny of thought be, which we know well that it is affirmative invention, or nothing at 
all?’ 
3 Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, Eng tr, 1997). 
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This long-standing arrangement went through several important permutations 
in Western Europe but its deeper significance was to be questioned upon what 
Jean-Francois Lyotard famously called the ‘linguistic turn’ of Western thought. 
Earlier on, Newton had explained, Descartes doubted, and Kant transcended but 
it was probably Nietzsche the last metaphysician (as Heidegger was to argue) or, 
indeed, the first of a new breed of thinkers to submit fully to the ultimate effect of 
modernity by actually venturing or wandering into a dimmed or darkening world 
whereby, it appeared, the breakdown of any primordial notion of authority or 
tradition had paved the way for the lessening or loosening of the authority or grip 
of any old and modern philosophical truth, scientific knowledge, political 
arrangement, artistic creation, and even amorous declaration. In that gloomier or 
no longer so luminous a world, the idea of art of course but also that of ethics, 
jurisprudence, or law sink back into their embodied or finite histories and from 
there into the turmoil of their individual or collective memories and to the 
clamour, or perhaps the murmur, of their voices. They become, in Nietzsche’s 
famous expression, figurative all the way down (even Hobbes might have agreed 
with that). Thus if indeed ‘the effort of social thought and philosophy since the 
Enlightenment can be described as an epic effort to ground knowledge and truth 
in a new age of radical rootlessness and doubt’,4 the key question gradually if 
unevenly becomes not just what specific languages poets as opposed to legislators 
might speak, but also, ironically, what languages might speak something like ‘law’ 
or ‘art’, ‘legislators’ or ‘poets’, and even ‘reason’ or ‘unreason’, for example. 
Politically that meant, for some, the need of multiplying their efforts in order to 
rediscover the human or even just the common in ethics, aesthetics, or justice 
while, for others, the question clearly required attending to the margins of the 
Western subject or even removing to the ‘open’. At a time when the human 
exploitation of life on earth has reached an unparalleled intensity in human history, 
others have concluded instead that it is technology as techne that speaks, or that so 
often speaks, the language of many languages. And so then it is technology that 
might provide the missing link or, depending on one’s views, inaugurate the 
hidden tensions that are supposed to exist today between, for example, the world 
of art and the world of law. 
This is of course a highly selective and probably insufficient picture of what 
really happened during much of the twentieth century. However the point here is 
neither to map out such a complex event as the linguistic turn nor to debate 
whether such turn was, after all, more persuasive in its various ‘continental’ 
instantiations or in its equally numerous ‘analytical’ applications, nor, finally, to 
consider whether or not the former could be seriously regarded to be eminently 
‘American’, as Cusset perhaps understandably suggests. Instead the point here is to 
register how by the beginning of the twenty-first century the model of language, 
                                                     
4 C. Douzinas, R. Warrington, and S. McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991) 9. 
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Frédéric Worms has recently argued, appears to be dwindling.5 For Worms, the 
present moment (moment présent) appears to be marked by a return (réprise) of 
philosophy and of history and, on the other hand, of philosophy and of the life 
sciences. The question then – and it must remain an open question, at least for the 
time being – is less whether we are in for a return to such disciplines – if there is 
one thing that the linguistic turn will have conclusively demonstrated that is just 
how porous the boundaries of disciplines can be – than it is, one might argue, to 
examine how each of those fields of inquiry might be shaping up in the aftermath 
of an event that has ‘hit’ them in a way that can hardly be ignored or, for that 
matter, revoked into doubt. Language, one feels, has come (back) to stay, at least 
for a little longer than some of its detractors might hope. The more interesting 
problem then may be whether, by now, anything else is on offer which would help 
us think the contemporary situation and, here, the relationship between art and 
law, the poet and the city, afresh. 
In such a fluid or confused situation – where the ‘confusion’ seems to belong 
to the present rather than to any particular field of inquiry such as, for example, 
philosophy or history6 – the work of French philosopher Alain Badiou occupies a 
unique position for its continued defence and imaginative deployment of a certain 
Platonism. In a short but powerful text published in 1992 and entitled The (Re)turn 
of Philosophy Itself, Badiou sums up his general thesis regarding philosophy in four 
key points. The first one is that philosophy itself must recommence. The second 
point is that philosophy must break with historicism: ‘Philosophy must determine 
itself in such a way as to judge its history itself, and not to have its history judge it.’7 
The third point is that a definition of philosophy does in fact exist and, 
importantly, can be distinguished from both early and latter-day or postmodern 
philosophical sophistry. Early sophists ‘maintain that thought is […] either effects 
of discourse, language games, or the silent indication, the pure “showing” of 
something subtracted from the clutches of language’.8 Latter-day sophists, by 
contrast, argue for ‘a general equivalence of discourses, a rule of virtuosity and 
obliquity’ attempting ‘to compromise the very idea of truth in the fall of historic 
narratives’ and critiquing Hegel and philosophy itself ‘to the benefit of art, or 
Right, or an immemorial or unutterable Law’.9 In general, sophists are to be taken 
with a pinch of salt in so far as they seek ‘to set the strength of the rule, and, more 
broadly, modalities of the linguistic authority of the Law against the revelation or 
production of the true’.10 Finally, the fourth and perhaps most important point is, 
for Badiou, that there are truths after all, and that to stand by that evidence is neither 
to embrace the sort of idealism criticised by a certain Marxism, nor to subscribe to 
                                                     
5 F. Worms, Philosophie en France au XX Siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 2009). 
6 Worms, n 5 above, 555. 
7 A. Badiou ‘(Re)turn of Philosophy Itself’ in A. Badiou (ed), Manifesto for Philosophy (1992, Albany: SUNY, 
Eng tr, 1999) 115-116. 
8 ibid, 116. 
9 ibid, 117. 
10 ibid, 118. 
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Heidegger’s historical meditation, nor, finally, to turn yet again to Plato’s 
mathematical objects and to what Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy might 
dismiss as a ‘metaphysics of the supra-sensible’.11 
Badiou’s four theses are designed to declare the end of the end of philosophy 
and so to reopen ‘the Plato question […] to examine whether it is not by an other 
Platonic gesture that our future thinking must be supported’.12 Such a gesture would 
recognise how the operational or logical Truth of Platonic philosophy is that in the 
beginning there are truths that philosophy will have subsequently declared to be 
compossible. Or, philosophy is, in a way that will have to be further examined, a 
possible and necessary yet purely subtractive operation designed to produce the 
effect of Truth as against the effect of sense and an operation, moreover, that is 
‘driven by the intensity of love without an object’ and by means of ‘a persuasive 
strategy without any stakes in power’.13 
Thus for Badiou the question of the relationship between art and law 
becomes at first a question of thinking four distinctive truth procedures in their 
ontological, logical, and subjective dimensions: 
 
We shall thus posit that there are four conditions of philosophy, and that the 
lack of a single one gives rise to its dissipation, just as the emergence of all 
four conditioned its apparition. These conditions are: the matheme, the 
poeme, political invention and love. We shall call the set of these conditions 
generic procedures.14 
 
Such a striking task presents at least two preliminary challenges for those who are 
interested in the question of the relationship between art and law as this might 
present itself from Badiou’s point of view. On the one hand, Badiou’s critique 
seems to be built on the assumption of a continuity between legal and political 
arrangements that some legal and political theorists might find difficult to 
recognise, let alone accept.15 On the other hand, such a critique could be seen to 
reinstate philosophy, and for no obvious reason, into its long-standing aspiration 
to arbitrate over that ‘ancient quarrel’ between the city and the poet that Stanley 
Rosen has recently re-examined. And yet, Badiou’s philosophy – which, he never 
tires of repeating, does not produce truths of its own but merely ‘configurates the 
becoming-disparate of the system of its conditions by construction of a space of 
thoughts of the time’16 – may be attractive precisely because we live in a time 
when global capitalism seems to have brought about a hazy state of fragmentation 
that, oddly enough, leaves us stranded with a somewhat limited alternative 
between the rather disconcerting spectacle of an endless number of paradoxical or 
                                                     
11 ibid, 121. 
12 ibid, 122. See A. Toscano, ‘To Have Done with the End of Philosophy’ (2000) 9 PLI 220. 
13 Badiou, n 7 above, 127. 
14 A. Badiou, ‘Manifesto for Philosophy’ in A. Badiou, n 7 above,  35. 
15 M Shapiro, ‘Law and Politics: The Problem of Boundaries’ in K. Whittington, R.D. Keleman, and G. 
Caldeira (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
16 Badiou, n 14 above, 39. 
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self-referential legal, political, artistic, and other domains (or even eigenvalues), and 
on the other hand an equally endless albeit contrasting horizon of overlapping 
discourses or regimes such as that of the political, the juridical, the cultural, and so 
on and so forth. In such an obviously unsustainable situation, are those domains 
or those overlapping discourses or regimes not in need to be thought afresh, and 
otherwise? Can we think that which pertains to art, politics, and law separately and 
yet together rather than treating them, by contrast, either as essentially different or 
as essentially in-different worlds, that is to say, in a way that either would 
hopelessly accelerate their reciprocal isolation or that, alternatively, would dissipate 
them into a baffling communicative continuum where no difference is, ultimately, 
really possible or even just desirable? And indeed, is there an alternative to the 
danger of complacent introspection that is somehow unavoidable in difference 
and even more so in self-reference and, on the other hand, to the equally obscure 
danger of giving up thinking altogether? And what might that tell us of the specific 
question that concerns us here, that of the relationship between art and law in the 
work of Alain Badiou? 
Finally, it is worth adding that Badiou’s recent publication of numerous new 
essays, as well as the publication of Logiques des mondes (Part II of his major earlier 
work, L’être et l’événement), are being hotly debated, unsurprisingly in my view, well 
beyond academia. And indeed, to quote Peter Hallward, Badiou’s work may well 
constitute the ‘most powerful alternative yet conceived in France to the various 
forms of postmodernism that arose after the collapse of the Marxist project’.17 For 
Alberto Toscano, ‘Badiou presents us with what is perhaps the most effective 
critique of the very conditions for what has become the nostalgic, crepuscular, and 
ultimately reactionary tonality of much of European philosophy.’18 For 
Christopher Norris, ‘Badiou’s thinking is remarkable chiefly for taking so strong 
and principled a stand against just about every major direction of the present-day 
philosophic tide.’19 And finally even Peter Goodrich admits, albeit one suspects 
obtorto collo, that ‘Badiou has taken over the coveted spot of regnant French 
philosopher in the Anglophone world’.20 
 
 
 
ART, PHILOSOPHY, AND TRUTH 
 
Art occupies a somewhat enigmatic place in Badiou’s oeuvre. On the one hand, 
Badiou argues, art qua language has, since Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, 
adopted or even appropriated certain functions that thus far had been on the 
whole the domain of philosophy qua (metaphysical) thought. And yet, for Badiou, 
                                                     
17 P. Hallward, ‘Generic Sovereignty: The Philosophy of Alain Badiou’ (1998) Angelaki 87. 
18 Toscano, n 12 above, 223. 
19 C. Norris, ‘Some Versions of Platonism: Mathematics and Ontology According to Alain Badiou’ (2008) 
Philosophical Frontiers 1, 1. 
20 P. Goodrich, ‘Preface (On Alain Badiou’s Handwriting)’ (2008) 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1867, 1867. 
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the age of the poets is now completed and so philosophy must be untied or 
desutured from art. On the other hand, however, art and in particular poetry 
remains central to Badiou’s philosophy, both as a key form of truth-event 
(together, that is, with science, politics, and love) and more specifically insofar as 
the poem, he explains, ‘is language itself, in its solitary exposition as an exception 
to the noise that has usurped the place of comprehension’.21 Thus, one might say, 
art is not philosophy for Badiou, and yet the value of that negation, the value of 
that ‘not’, lies not in the banishment or even in what Jean-Luc Nancy might call 
l’être abandonné or Giorgio Agamben la messa al bando of art by philosophy, but 
rather in something like a recognition or foregrounding of the ‘thought of the 
poem’ itself, along with that of the thought of ontology or science (the matheme), 
of the thought of politics (the political invention), and of the thought of love.22 
This is crucial for all sorts of reasons but here let us just stress how the shift 
almost imperceptibly operated by Badiou is from the subjection to an exception – 
the rather dubious template that has become fashionable upon the ‘rediscovery’ in 
recent years of Carl Schmitt’s contributions to constitutional theory – to 
differentiation by reinvention, repositioning, or reopening, and how this is an 
important shift if one is fully to grasp Badiou’s highly distinctive take on art and 
philosophy. To be sure, philosophy for Badiou has always been tempted by 
poetry, and so poetry has always been ‘the precise equivalent of a symptom’ for 
philosophy.23 But poetry is the symptom of philosophy not, as tradition would 
have it, because poetry imitates while philosophy does in fact speak the truth but 
rather because poetry is a ‘properly incalculable thought’, wholly other than 
thought proper (mathematical thought or ontology).24 Art then is not philosophy, 
and philosophy is not art – but neither are matheme, political invention, or love. 
instead, they all sit together unconcerned, one might say, by one another, and that 
is what is most attractive for philosophy which in turn must make their different 
thoughts manifest in their compossibility.25 Take the Preface to the Italian edition 
of his Manifeste pour la philosophie: 
 
Philosophy is the place of thought where the ‘there are’ of truths and their 
compossibility are declared. To that end, philosophy sets up an operative 
category, Truth, which opens up within thought an active void. Such a void is 
identified on the basis of the reverse of a sequence […] and of the beyond of 
a limit. Philosophy, as discourse, operates thus a superimposition of two 
fictions, one cognitive and one artistic.26 
                                                     
21 A. Badiou, ‘Language, Thought, Poetry’ in R. Brassier and A. Toscano (eds), Theoretical Writings: Alain 
Badiou (London and New York: Continuum, 2006) 241. 
22 A. Badiou, Handbook of Inesthetics (1998, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
23 A. Badiou, ‘Notes’ in R. Brassier and A. Toscano (eds), n 21 above, 245. 
24 ibid, 246. 
25 I. Stramignoni, ‘Badiou’s Nocturnal Jurisprudence’ (2008) 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2361. 
26 ‘La filosofia è il luogo del pensiero in cui si enuncia il “c’è” delle verità e la loro compossibilità. A tale 
fine, essa mette a punto una categoria operativa, la Verità, che apre nel pensiero un vuoto attivo. Tale 
vuoto è individuato in base all’inverso di una successione [...] e all’al di là di un limite [...] La filosofia, 
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Thus philosophy for Badiou amounts to a ‘subtractive’ or ‘nocturnal’ discourse 
operating as a form of poetic as well as of cognitive fiction – that is to say, as 
something rigorous yet inventive. And ‘[i]n the void opened up by the gap or 
interval between the two fictions, philosophy seizes the truths. This seizing is its 
act’.27 As fiction of knowledge, Badiou explains, philosophical discourse qua 
discourse of truth imitates the matheme. As fiction of art, on the other hand, 
philosophical discourse imitates poetry.28 Finally philosophy imitates an objectless 
love through the intensity of its seizing. And as that which is directed towards all, 
philosophy imitates a political strategy without the power.29 Philosophy, in short, 
will be rigorously and poetically and passionately to state to all that there are truths 
after all. 
In his Petit manuel d’inesthetique Badiou looks closer to the relationship of art 
and philosophy and puts forward the thesis according to which art should be 
understood as a truth procedure sui generis, both immanent and singular. This, he 
argues, would be an entirely novel philosophical proposition in a century that, for 
all its endings, breaks, and catastrophes, did not really depart from the three 
existing schemata of that relationship. Even Deleuze, Badiou adds, fails to 
appreciate the true extent to which art is both immanent and singular and so, 
consequently, the extent to which art thinks. And the reason for this is 
(deceptively) simple. ‘This is because,’ Badiou explains, ‘if one fails to summon the 
category of truth in this affair, one cannot hope to succeed in establishing the 
plane of immanence from which the differentiation between art, science, and 
philosophy can proceed.’30 The category of truth thus is needed if one is 
successfully to tell art, science, or philosophy from one another. 
The first traditional schema of the relationship between philosophy and art is, 
for Badiou, the didactic schema whose twentieth century expression is exemplified, 
he argues, by Brecht’s Marxist and ‘scientific’ theatre which, in its insistence on 
searching for the immanent rules of art produced ‘an artistic invention of the first 
calibre within the reflexive element of a subordination of art’.31 According to the 
didactic schema ‘art is incapable of truth, or […] all truth is external to art.’32 That 
is to say, art and philosophy are clearly separate endeavours. Indeed, art would be 
like Lacan’s Hysteric in his or her relationship to the Master. It would seek to 
present itself in its nakedness to the philosopher, asking the philosopher to tell 
them who they are. Although charmed by it, the philosopher however would 
ultimately reject art’s seduction on account that art in this way would constitute 
                                                                                                                                       
come discorso, opera così la sovrapposizione di due finzioni, una di sapere e una d’arte.’ A. Badiou, 
‘Prefazione all’Edizione Italiana’ in Manifesto per la Filosofia (Napoli: Cronopio, 1991) 20. 
27 ‘Nel vuoto aperto dallo scarto o intervallo tra le due finzioni, la filosofia coglie le verità. Questo 
coglimento è il suo atto.’ ibid, 20. 
28 ‘Finzione del sapere, la filosofia imita il matema. Finzione d’arte, imita la poesia.’ ibid, 20. 
29 ‘Intensità di un atto, essa è come un amore senza oggetto. Rivolta a tutti affinchè tutti colgano 
l’esistenza delle verità, essa è come una strategia politica senza fini di potere.’ ibid, 20. 
30 Badiou, n 22 above, 10. 
31 ibid, 6. 
32 ibid, 2. 
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not only an imitation of things but, more seriously, an imitation of the effect of 
truth. The charge here would be as straightforward as it would be damming. ‘If 
truth can exist as charm, then we are fated to lose the force of dialectical labor, of 
the slow argumentation that prepares the way for the ascent to Principle. We must 
therefore denounce the supposedly immediate truth of art as a false truth, as the 
semblance that belongs to the effect of truth.’33 Alternatively, art in the didactic 
scheme would be permitted by philosophy insofar as it would undertake to be 
educational and so remain under philosophy’s control. In such case, ‘the “good” 
essence of art is conveyed in its public effect, and not in the artwork itself.’34 
In the romantic schema art alone, Badiou continues, is capable of truth. In the 
twentieth century the romantic schema finds a home, above all, within 
Heideggerian hermeneutics according to which the poet is sovereign and ‘the 
thinker is nothing but the announcement of a reversal, the promise of the advent 
of the gods at the height of our distress, and the retroactive elucidation of the 
historicality of being. While the poet, in the flesh of language, maintains the 
effaced guarding of the Open’.35 
Thus interpretation and poem in the romantic schema coincide or, which is 
the same, art is held to amount to the body itself of truth, or to the absolute 
subject, or true incarnation. Therefore art, not philosophy, would have the task of 
educating us, namely by explaining how the power of infinity is held captive by 
form and so delivering us ‘from the subjective barrenness of the concept’.36 
If the didactic schema hystericises art and the romantic one glorifies it, then 
the third schema, the classical or Aristotelian schema, Badiou argues, dehystericises 
art. Such schema is found, for example, in psychoanalysis and specifically in 
Freud’s analyses of painting or in Lacan’s externations regarding poetry and the 
theatre. While concurring with the didactic schema that art is incapable of truth, 
the classical schema finds such predicament to be unproblematic in so far as art, 
according to it, does not in fact claim to be truth. Neither revelatory nor cognitive, 
art’s function is, in the classical schema, therapeutic. Thus if it is liked, art is good 
for the classical schema and whether or not it is actually true is irrelevant insofar as 
the artwork is liked as true. Here, in the classical schema, art is ‘entirely exhausted 
by its act or by its public operation’.37 Art becomes quite literally a service and an 
educational one at that. 
At the turn of a century – which, Badiou concludes, was simultaneously 
conservative and eclectic – we are however left with the saturation of the three 
existing schemata and attendant disrelation of art and philosophy, but also with the 
closure represented by a sort of synthetic, ubiquitous, didactico-romantic schema. 
Which then would be the way out of this rather unsatisfactory situation paralysing 
thought? The way out would be to recognise the relationship of art and 
                                                     
33 ibid. 
34 ibid, 3. 
35 ibid, 6. 
36 ibid, 3. 
37 ibid, 5. 
                14/2010 
 
 10
philosophy as marked by both the immanent and the singular character of art, and 
specifically to recognise art as ‘a truth procedure […] a thought in which artworks 
are the Real (and not the effect). And this thought, or rather the truths that it 
activates, are irreducible to other truths – be they scientific, political, or amorous. 
This also means that art, as a singular regime of thought, is irreducible to 
philosophy’.38 
In Badiou’s own and unique schema the pedagogical function of art would be 
laid bare by its arrangement of extant knowledge and subsequent exposure of 
some truth within. Art here would educate us to nothing else than its own 
existence and in so doing, educate us to encounter thought or else to think 
through a form of thought or, which is the same, to think thought [penser une pensée] 
through an artistic procedure’s own singular way.  
Which, finally, would be the appropriate unity of an immanent and singular 
art such as that which Badiou points out to? The artwork, no doubt, is ‘the only 
finite thing that exists’ which is precisely why, Badiou argues, the artwork cannot 
be what might allow us to think ‘art’ in a truly inventive way. Thus art is not the 
artwork while, at the same time, certain works will one day have been found to be 
the work of art (art, in other words, always precedes the artwork). Furthermore, 
art for Badiou must never be thought independently of a prior event – quoting 
Mallarmé, for example, Badiou reminds us how ‘made, existing, [the poem] takes 
place all alone’39 – under pain of falling head-on into an ‘idealistic conception of 
invention’ that Badiou (who is a materialist after all) cannot but reject.40 A ‘fact of 
art’ (not an event) and, as such, ‘the local instance or differential point of a truth’ 
(not, therefore, a truth), an artwork is rather what Badiou now designates as the 
subject of an artistic procedure or, which is the same, ‘the subject point of an artistic 
truth’.41 
Such complex analysis has important consequences for the eventual 
appreciation of the relationship of art and law in the work of Alain Badiou. First, 
the sole being of an artistic truth is the being of works as these weave being 
together after the event and ‘by the chance of their successive occurrences’.42 Thus 
works are enquiries about truths and, as such, they are retroactively validated as real 
works of art whenever it is ascertained that such enquiries are new. Secondly, 
artistic truths are, then, ‘artistic configurations initiated by an event […] and 
unfolded through chance in the form of the works that serve as its subjects 
points’.43 Importantly, a configuration is, for Badiou, an ‘identifiable sequence’ 
rather than an art form, a genre or objective period in the history of art, or a 
technical dispositif. Thus, for example, the evental rupture of Greek tragedy, for 
Badiou, bears the name ‘Aeschylus’ understood as the index of a central void in 
                                                     
38 ibid, 9. 
39 Badiou, n 23 above, 240. 
40 Badiou, n 22 above, 11. 
41 ibid, 12. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
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the previous situation of choral poetry and as the initial event of tragedy as the 
configuration or identifiable sequence that runs from Plato or Aristotle to 
Nietzsche and which, however, reaches its point of saturation with Euripides. 
Thirdly and lastly, it cannot be for philosophy to think an artistic configuration. 
Rather, ‘a configuration thinks itself in the works that compose it.’44 A work or inquiry, in 
other words, tests an artistic configuration as this will have been upon its infinite 
completion and, in so doing, lets art be ‘the thinking of the thought that itself is’.45 
The overall result of Badiou’s inaugural gesture in relation to art is that art is 
now successfully subtracted or unsutured from philosophy. And philosophy, for 
its part, has now been reassigned its job which, in relation to art, must be from 
now on to reinvent, reposition, or reopen art, and so neither to banish it (for what, 
after all, is to ‘think’ art in the traditional way if not to exclude it from the city?) 
nor, at the other extreme, to subject itself to it, to subject itself to an exception 
that, ironically, has become the rule. But if, as Badiou is adamant to stress, one 
should have the courage to declare that art is art, and philosophy is philosophy, 
how then is the relationship of art and law vis-à-vis one another? 
An answer to that question can be found only after one has considered first 
how, in Badiou’s oeuvre, politics plays out ‘against’ the law. 
 
 
 
LAW AND POLITICS 
 
Badiou himself refers sparingly to the legal rules and legal institutions of 
modernity. For him, as for Marx, modern capitalism leads to the expropriation of 
the means of production by some, which then the State in parliamentary 
democracy upholds and, through its laws and legal institutions, enforces and 
defends. Thus the law is always predicative, particular, and partial. It is, Badiou 
argues, the cipher of a finitude (le chiffre d’une finitude). So, for example, a law 
banning the use of the hijab at school is, for Badiou, a law required by capital in so 
far as it seeks to appropriate the femininity of a minority of young Muslim 
teenagers by instructing them to become exposed or unveiled as if commodities 
on show in the market place. Likewise, a law sorting out and then expelling those 
who are short of all the required documents (sans papiers) from those who, by 
contrast, can exhibit those documents, and so can stay, cannot be said to be the 
law of a truly democratic country. And finally, a party system that turns necessity 
into a figure of choice should not be surprised to discover that voters in a 
referendum might decide against a law they do not actually want. Accordingly, any 
concern with laws and with legal institutions must be taken to be implicit in any 
broader concern Badiou has with the State, with parliamentary democracy and so, 
today, with the ‘political’ (le politique) or what Badiou famously calls ‘capitalo-
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parliamentarianism’ (capitalo-parlamentarisme). Under capitalo-parliamentarism there 
is nothing but ‘management and law’.46 ‘[T]he rest’, he adds, ‘is literature.’47 
Badiou of course has always been concerned by the political, which for him is 
to be firmly distinguished from politics proper (la politique). In a recent series of 
lectures held at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris on occasion of the 2007 
elections of the new French President, Badiou reflects for example on what he 
perceives to be the ambiguous or porous nature of the electoral mechanism in 
contemporary parliamentary democracies, that is to say, a mechanism that lies at 
the heart of the political. In the face of such ambiguity or porousness, which 
paradoxically may turn voting into an instrument of oppression and of exclusion 
rather than one of emancipation and of participation, Badiou urges the 
abandonment of any illusion about voting and the embrace instead of eight key 
points, the most important of which would be that there is after all one world. 
That, Badiou explains, is what is really at stake in politics today.  
Others of course have maintained, like Badiou, that politics are to be clearly 
distinguished from the political. Indeed, such a distinction appears to be running 
through the whole of what is often termed ‘left-Heideggerian’, or interpretive, or 
genealogical, or postmodern, or deconstructive, or ‘post-foundational’ political 
thought, and, obversely, through the political philosophy of the likes of Carl 
Schmitt. However, for Badiou real politics do not dwell at the threshold, or next 
to, or in the interstices of, or elsewhere than, or at the margins of, the political, nor 
do they become utterly impotent or, alternatively, nuda vita vis-à-vis the political in 
the state of emergency. All to the contrary, real politics for Badiou eschew the 
political insofar as today what is presented by that name is a particular yet highly 
unstable mode (the State) of a particular yet highly unstable politics 
(parliamentarism) legitimated by a particular yet highly unstable definition of 
plurality (pluralism) and regulated by three particular yet highly unstable norms 
(economy, the nation, and democracy). The political coincides, for Badiou, with a 
no doubt potent but ultimately ineffective reification of politics that is carried out 
or at least encouraged by the particular political philosophy that has reigned 
sovereign and apparently unchallenged in contemporary parliamentary 
democracies and that holds ‘politics – or, better still, the political – as an objective 
datum, or even invariant, of universal experience’.48  
By contrast, real politics for Badiou are always plural and always brought 
about by multiple subjects who become such by virtue of their own singular 
relation to a truth-event. Above all, politics are a tearing away of the vacant surface 
of language which goes to form the ‘state of the situation’. But what is the state of 
the situation? Structures for Badiou are certain inconsistent multiplicities that will 
have been counted as one. Thus inconsistency is at once the precondition and the 
residue of structural unification, as Badiou sees it. Yet structures are inexorably 
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haunted by the void they obscure but cannot suppress. In set theory terms, such a 
void is neither a term nor the whole, neither something local nor something 
global, but rather a ‘part’ or sub-multiple that is included but does not belong. So 
if the void – ‘which is the name of inconsistency in the situation’ and which 
continually haunts presentation – is to be however superficially warded off, the 
structure of the situation needs not only to be presented, but also to be re-
presented as such.49 Ontologically, then, the state of the situation is ‘that by means 
of which the structure of a situation – of any structured presentation whatsoever – 
is counted as one, which is to say the one of the one-effect itself, or what Hegel 
calls the One-One’.50 Or again, it is ‘the riposte to the void obtained by the count-
as-one of its parts [which] proposes a clause of closure and security, through 
which the situation consists according to the one’.51 Finally, the state of the 
situation is always a separate or transcendental entity vis-à-vis the initial structure 
of the situation but also, and at the same time, the state of the situation is of that 
structure, immanent to it. That is to say, the state of the situation is both distinct 
from and linked to the initial structure so that this is ‘furnished with a fictional 
being: the latter banishes, or so it appears, the peril of the void, and establishes the 
reign, since completeness is numbered, of the universal security of the one’.52  
Politically, on the other hand, the State for Badiou is, with Marxism, a 
structure of domination defined by a principle of counting that is ultimately 
removed from or uninterested in – and yet, at the same time, historically tied to – 
the individuals it counts. Thus the State is ‘the law that guarantees that there is 
Oneness’ and that ‘re-presents what has already been presented’.53 And yet against 
Marxism and with Hobbes, the State for Badiou ‘is not founded upon the social bond, 
which it would express, but rather upon un-binding, which it prohibits’.54 Thus the politics 
that follow on a political event will have been a dialectical interrupting of the 
State’s ubiquitous representation of the situation that in turn will have triggered ‘a 
show of power by the State’ and so, then, will have put ‘the State at a distance, in 
the distance of its measure’.55 Politics, in other words, is not the political but that 
which opens up a gap or a wound in the body of the dominant political fiction 
and, in so doing, Oliver Marchart notes, touches on the real. Or, politics is that 
which designates the order of truth and of the political event, and not, as is the 
case for Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, the order of power and of 
police. 
Thus instead of attempting to build one world out of the inevitable 
fragmentation and individuation sought out and fostered by modern capitalism 
and supported by democracy as this is normally understood, the question for 
Badiou would be how to declare the existence of one world, of one indivisible 
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world that belongs to everybody, and so finally of a world that will have existed, all 
machinations to the contrary notwithstanding, even as these are supported, as they 
often are, by one form or another of repression or violence. In a world 
continuously broken down into nothing else than things and linguistic signs, the 
attempt must be therefore to declare that nevertheless, ‘there is one world’ where 
differences will be taken to be that which constitutes the world rather than that 
which divides it – such is what Badiou calls the ‘transcendental’ of the world 
whose immanent logical law it also is – and where particular laws exist that, 
however, are never really a condition to be part of that world: 
 
You might say that there are the laws of each country to take into account. 
Indeed. But a law is something completely different from a precondition. A 
law applies equally to all; it does not set a precondition for belonging to the 
world.  It is simply a provisional rule that exists in a particular region of the 
single world. And no one is asked to love a law, simply to obey it.56 
 
Here, Badiou’s grasp of law in the contemporary world might seem to be 
exceedingly ‘French’, permissible though such an interpretation would otherwise 
be from a political viewpoint privileging history or even historicity and culture 
over ontology, logic, and subjectivity. But it is not clear that Badiou has gone that 
far yet, or indeed that he will ever go that for (although he has indicated that he is 
aware of the task that may be laying ahead), for the simple reason that, ironically, it 
is politics, not the political, that constitutes the heart of Badiou’s own politics. 
Nevertheless we should by now begin to see Badiou’s complex position 
regarding the relationship of politics and law. To start with, while law is on the 
side of the political, politics for Badiou is not. Secondly, real politics and the 
political (the city and its laws) are, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding,  
not just separate realms but also something of a ‘scandal’ or an obstacle to one 
another that both sides must deal with, yet neither side can probably remove. And 
so just as politics must continuously subtract itself from the political, insofar at 
least as the latter insists on projecting the particular fiction of parliamentary 
democracy at the expenses of infinite multiplicity, so conversely the political seeks 
at all times to overcome real politics insofar as the political needs to keep out that 
which, by contrast, politics is always intent on reintroducing. And, it seems to me, 
one duty of philosophical thought is, for Badiou, to highlight just that. It is to 
highlight how the political blots out the world even if, on the surface, it appears to 
be seeking to unite it,57 whereas politics, by contrast, aspires to unite the world 
even if, on the surface, it may appear to be seeking to disrupt it. 
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DEMOCRACY AND ART 
 
In the Preface to the Italian edition of the Manifeste pour la philosophie Badiou goes 
back to what are possibly the two key tenets of his thought. First, there is a 
category of Truth that, Badiou guarantees, constitutes an absolute novelty in 
philosophy and, importantly, is able to eschew all ways of Nietzschean criticisms 
levelled at metaphysical thought by being neither correspondence, nor coherence, 
nor usefulness, nor even unconcealment, but, rather generic singularity. Secondly, 
there is the acknowledgement that language is important, but there is the 
conviction, too, that language is not all and it is certainly not the transcendental 
condition of thought that old and new sophists alike claim it to be. Instead 
crucially, ‘it is from the trajectory of a truth that the linguistic invention proceeds, 
and not the other way round.’58 Or, as Badiou puts it in another essay, ‘[a] world, 
for Plato as well as for myself, can only become visible through the differences 
constructed within it, and singularly through the difference, in the first place 
between a truth and an opinion, and secondly between two truths whose type is 
not the same.’59 
So what, for Badiou, is at stake today in the relationship between the poet and 
the city, between art and law? The answer is complex and to some extent 
uncertain, but is seems to me that such a relationship could not be properly 
appreciated without a few prior steps, which must be performed at once.  
Firstly, we are invited to think afresh – to invent, position, and open afresh – 
the relationship between art, philosophy, and thought or ontology as matheme, 
especially in consideration of the now ubiquitous didactico-romantic suture. Thus 
philosophy for Badiou is not art, and art is not thought, but rather something like 
a truth procedure immanent to thought and singular. 
Secondly one must think afresh – invent, position, and open afresh – the 
relationship between the political (the city and its laws) on the one hand, and 
politics on the other hand. One will then discover that politics is not really the 
political, and yet it is in politics, not in the political, that new political truth-events 
occur.  
Thirdly, philosophy cannot however produce artistic configurations or 
political inventions of its own. Or, philosophy can certainly think thought in its 
various instantiations (science, politics, art, and love), but these do not need 
philosophy to think themselves, and in particular to think their own respective 
truths. Thus the common fear that philosophy might be taking again the didactic 
position assigned to it by Plato would be unfounded. Instead, the task of 
philosophy would be to make new artistic configurations and new political 
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inventions manifest in their compossibility. ‘Finally, philosophy makes disparate 
truths compossible and, on that basis, it states the being of the time in which it 
operates as the time of the truths that arise within it.’60 
At this point, an unexpected yet rather exhilarating question arises:  
 
This question of the existence of truths (that ‘there be truths’) points to a co-
responsibility of art, which produces truths, and philosophy, which under the 
condition that there are truths, is duty-bound to make them manifest. 
Basically to make truths manifest means the following: to distinguish truths 
from opinion. So that the question today is this and no other: is there 
something besides opinion? In other words (one will, or will not, forgive the 
provocation), is there something besides our ‘democracies’?61 
 
Thus the relationship between politics and the city and its laws on the one hand, 
and between politics and art or artistic configurations on the other, seems to 
amount, in Badiou’s strictly intra-philosophical discourse, to a ‘subtractive’ 
relationship  between democracy as we know it, and new forms of belonging that can 
and will always emerge from the central void of the contemporary situation. And 
this is probably one of the deepest, most interesting, and most promising 
challenges raised by Badiou’s extraordinary interventions on art, politics, and law. 
For once the current links between philosophy, art, politics, and law are properly 
severed, at stake in the philosophical examination of the tension in late modernity 
between the city and its laws on the one hand, and current artistic configurations 
or identifiable political sequences on the other, would be precisely this, that is to 
say, nothing less than the future state of democracy itself. And if, as Badiou 
poetically puts it, ‘the destiny of thought […] must be affirmative invention or 
nothing at all’,62 then the duty of philosophy must indeed be ‘to reconstitute 
rationally the reserve of affirmative infinity that any emancipatory project 
requires’.63 
The truth is, for Badiou, that democracy can and must be reinvented. And 
that is where, today, the relationship between the poet and the city becomes 
crucial. The stakes, for Badiou, are high. 
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